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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
PRIVACY EXEMPTION-HOW Similar Is a "Similar File"?-Pacific
Molasses Co. v. NLRB Regional Office No. 15, 577 F.2d 1172
(5th Cir. 1978).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The need for making information contained in government
files available to the publicI was the major force behind passage of
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) by Congress in 1966. 2 In
the past, government agencies 3 had successfully avoided disclosure
to the public of the significant amounts of information within their
control. 4 Citizens denied access to this information had no opportu
nity to scrutinize government decisions or to hold federal agencies
accountable for their actions. Congress intended the FOIA to help
end government abuse of its powers. 5

1. See J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 1-5 (1978). Federal
records are potentially a major source of information on a variety of subjects ranging
from nuclear power to housing discrimination. The studies and information held by
the government lose much of their usefulness when the public does not have access
to them.
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). See J. O'REILLY, supra note 1, at 1-1 to 4-12.
3. An agency, for Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) purposes, includes any
federal or executive branch entity exercising the authority of the United States gov
ernment. Independence of authority is the key criterion used to determine which in
stitutions qualify as agencies. Private corporations, as well as state and local govern
ments, are excluded from the provisions of the FOIA. The National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) is clearly an agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1976). See also
Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
4. Until the 1950's, agencies had full power to do as they wished with information, and they frequently kept their files to themselves. Through the Housekeeping
Statutes, 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976), based on enactments in 1789, federal agency heads
have traditionally had control over possession of files and were not inclined to dis
close them to the public. See generally J. O'REILLY, supra note 1, at 2-1-2-16. See
also Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV.
GR.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1970) (discusses avoidance techniques agencies use to with
hold information).
5. A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and
the intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of its in
formation varies. A danger signal to our democratic society in the United
States is the fact that such a political truisnl' needs repeating.... The needs
of the electorate have outpaced the laws which gl!arantee public access to
the facts in Government.... S. 1160 [The Freedom of Information Act] will
correct this situation. It provides the necessary machinery to assure the
availability of Government information necessary to an informed electorate.
H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1965), reprinted in [1966] 2 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2418, 2429.
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Despite the Act's emphasis on the public's right to know, Con
gress also explicitly recognized the importance of withholding doc
uments in certain circumstances. As part of the FOIA, Congress
passed nine exemptions6 which specify instances in which consider
ations other than public access take precedence. 7 One exemption,
known as the privacy exemption, attempts to protect individual
rights. This exemption acknowledges that a democratic government
6. The FOrA includes the following exemptions:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are
(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Execu
tive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign pol
icy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section
552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the
issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to partic
ular types of matters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from
a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but
only to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere
with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial
or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of per
sonal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the
case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the
course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful na
tional security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished
only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and
procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement
personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition re
ports prepared by, on behalf of or for the use of an agency responsible for
the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps,
concerning wells.
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any per
son requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt
under this subsection.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
7. See Comment, The Freedom of Information Act: A Survey of Litigation Un
der the Exemptions, 48 MISS. L.J. 784 (1977) (for a discussion of the ForA exemp
tions). See also Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1977,
1978 DUKE L. J. 189.
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open to public scrutiny does not inherently require that there be
public disclosure of personal details relating to individuals. The pri
vacy exemption balances individual rights against public demands,
permitting agencies to withhold "personnel and medical files and
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. . . . "8
In a case of first impression, the United States Court of Ap
peals for the Fifth Circuit in Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB Re
gional Office No. 15 9 confronted the appropriate application of the
privacy exemption. In attempting to strike a balance between the
FOIA's purpose of disclosure and the individual right to privacy,
the court used a broad construction of the privacy exemption to
withhold union authorization cards. 10 By such an interpretation of
the exemption, the court limited the expressed policy of the FOIA.
Early in 1977, the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union
began unionization efforts at the Pacific Molasses Company. Fol
lowing standard procedures, the union obtained signatures of the
Pacific Molasses employees on authorization cards. These cards
serve as records indicating that a worker wants an opportunity to
vote on whether a union election should be held. An election was
held, however, the employees ultimately voted against a union.
The Pacific Molasses Company demanded to review the cards with
the intent of attacking the validity of the signatures and the accu
racy of the dates,l1 and thereby challenge the validity of an elec
tion. The Company's efforts to obtain the authorization cards were
presumably intended to discourage future unionization attempts.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which was hold
ing the cards, refused to release them to the Company.12 Pacific
Molasses brought suit under the FOIA in April 1977, in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana to com

8. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976).
9. 577 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1978).
10. Union authorization cards when signed by an employee constitute a show
ing of interest by that employee to schedule a union election. ld. at 1177. The infor
mation contained on a card includes the employee's name, address, telephone num
ber, 'department, shift and job classification as well as the employer's name and
location. ld. at 1175. The Third Circuit, in Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB,
566 F.2d 214 (3d CiT. 1977), is the only other circuit to have heard the issue of the
FOIA and union authorization cards. See Sobol, An Example of Judicial Legislation:
The Third Circuit's Expansion of Exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act to
Include Union Authorization Cards, 23 VILL. L. REV. 751 (1977-1978).
11. 577 F.2d at 1176.
12. ld.
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pel the NLRB Regional Office to release the cards,13 claiming that
they were government records which were subject to dfsclosure
under the FOIA.14 The NLRB argued that the protection of the
employees' privacy took precedence over the employer's desire to
view the signatures. The district court ordered the NLRB to dis
close the cards to the employer, holding that the information on
the cards, which included each. employee's name, job classifica
tion, and signature, was not sufficiently personal to warrant their
exemption. 1s
The NLRB appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which reversed,
13. Id. Although in this case, the union was not supported by the workers in
the election, valid reasons exist for an employer desiring access to the cards. In the
past, instances of fraud or misunderstanding by employees signing the cards have
occurred so that an employer's refusal to trust the validity of the cards could be
justified. Rather than allow the company to see the authorization cards, however, the
remedy by the courts in such cases has been to deny the NLRB's order for the em
ployer to bargain. See NLRB v. J.M. Mach. Corp., 410 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1969), in
which the court found that the employer's refusal to bargain was not in bad faith
where those employees signing the cards did not know that the purpose was solely to
obtain an election. See also Schwarzenback-Huber Co. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 236 (2d
Cir. 1969), cen. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969), in which misrepresentation to employ
ees that signing the cards was simply to have an election, was grounds for invali
dating those cards, when in fact, a signature meant an intent to join the union.
Prior to the passage of the FOIA, at least one case held that the employer was
not allowed to see authorization cards based on the secrecy of union elections pro
vided for by statute. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1973). See NLRB v. New Era Die Co., 118
F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1941). See also 29 C.F.R. § 102.117 (1979); C. MORRIs, THE DE
VELOPING LABOR LAW 156 (1971); Note, The Right to Disclosure of NLRB Docu
ments Under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119 (1976).
The NLRB has attempted to avoid disclosure under exemptions other than the
privacy exemption. The exemptions most frequently used include exemption 5, per
taining to inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters, and exemption 7, re
garding investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes. 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(5), (7) (1976). The courts have shown confusion in these areas equal to that of
the privacy exemption. See NLRB v. Biophysics Sys., Inc., 78 Lab. Cas. 20,781
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (cards exempt under exemption 7); cf, Donn Prods., Inc. v. NLRB,
229 N.L.R.B. 116 (cards not exempt under either exemption 5 or 7); Gerico, Inc. v.
NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2713 (D. Colo. 1976) (cards exempt under exemption 7A during
pendency of unfair labor practice proceeding, but not after). See also Wiegmann, The
Scope of FOIA Exemptions, 1977 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 1.
14. Questions have arisen as to what information falls under the jurisdiction of
the FOIA, what constitutes a "record", and what constitutes "in the possession" of
an agency. See Comment, What is a Record? Two Approaches to the Freedom of In
formation Act's Threshold Requirement, 1978 B.Y.L. REV. 408; Note, Applying the
FOIA in the Area of Federal Grant Law: Exploring An Unknown Entity, 27 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 294 (1978); Note, The Definition of Agency Records under the Freedom
of Information Act, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1093 (1979). See also Soucie v. David, 448
F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (a clear determination of what constitutes a record).
15. 577 F .2d at 1176.
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finding the cards exempt from disclosure under the FOIA privacy
exemption. The majority held that an individual's decision about
whether a union election should be scheduled is a matter of per
sonal choice, and thereby concluded that disclosure of the authori
zation cards would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
protected by the privacy exemption. 16
Fifth Circuit Senior Judge Skelton dissented. 17 Judge Skelton
discussed the problem that cases like Pacific Molasses create when
the privacy exemption is given a broad interpretation. He con
tended that the court's improper use of the test for determining
disclosure has expanded the exemption to the extent that any inva
sion of privacy, no matter how insubstantial, will result in
nondisclosure by an agency. Consequently, the privacy exemption
creates a loophole that facilitates government secrecy. Judge
Skelton stated that the holding in Pacific Molasses is inconsistent
with congressional intent of full disclosure of information held by
the government. IS This note analyzes Pacific Molasses and the con
flicting standards used in construing the privacy exemption. An ex
amination of the legislative history reveals the competing purposes
of the FOIA and its privacy exemption.

II.

AVAILABILITY OF AGENCY INFORMATION

The philosophy behind the FOIA is rooted in the Administra
tive Procedure Act (APA) of 1946. 19 The APA was Congress' first
16. See Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977),
which describes more thoroughly the personal nature used to exempt authorization
cards.
17. 577 F.2d at 1184.
18. Id. at 1188.
19. Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act is as follows:
Except to the extent that there is involved (1) any function of the United
States requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) any matter relating
solely to the internal management of an agency
(a) RULES.-Every agency shall separately state and currently publish in
the Federal Register (1) descriptions of its central and field organization
including delegations by the agency of final authority and the established
places at which, and methods whereby, the public may secure information
or make submittals or requests; (2) statements of the general course and
method by which its functions are .channeled and determined, including the
nature and requirements of all formal or info~mal· procedures available as
well as forms and instructions as to the scope and contents of all papers, re
ports, or examinations; and (3) substantive rules adopted as authorized by
law and statements of general policy or interpretations formulated and
adopted by the agency for the guidance of the public, but not rules ad
dressed to and served upon named persons in accordance with law. No per
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attempt to rectify government secrecy. This legislation was aimed
at all federal agencies, and specifically at those, such as the Veter
an's Administration and the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, which
were accumulating large amounts of information about individuals,
yet denying the public access to that material. 20
The APA generally was unsuccessful in accomplishing its pur
pose. Government agencies commonly avoided disclosing informa
tion under the APA because of two primary interpretational diffi
culties in the Act's provisions. The first difficulty under the APA
centered on the provision which allowed an exemption to disclo
sure "for good cause. "21 The absence of standards defining the
term "good cause" allowed agencies to interpret it to their benefit.
Consequently, whenever agency personnel felt there was a suffi
cient reason to withhold information, the material was kept confi
dential. 22 The second loophole involved the APA's provision
granting standing to sue for information only to those persons "di
rectly and properly concerned" with obtaining such information. 23
The legislative history contains no definition of "directly and prop
erly concerned." By alleging that the requester had no inherent
right to the material, agencies had further leeway to prevent disson shall in any manner be required to resort to organization or procedure
not so published.
(b) OPINIONS AND ORDERS.-Every agency shall publish or, in accord
ance with published rule, make available to public inspection all final opin
ions or orders in the adjudication of cases (except those requried for good
cause to be held confide~tial and not cited as precedents) and all rules.
(c) PUBLIC RECORDS.-Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of
official record shall in accordance with published rule be made available to
persons properly and directly concerned except information held confiden
tial for good cause found.
5 U.S.C. §§ 1002(a)-(c) (1976).
20. See generally J. O'REILLY, supra note 1; Note, Freedom of Information and
the Individual's Right to Privacy: Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 14 CALIF.
W. L. REV. 183 (1978); Note, Comments on Pr.oposed Amendments to Section 3 of
the Administrative Procedure Act: The Freedom of Information Bill, 40 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 417 (1965).
21. 5 U.S.C. § l002(c) (1976).
22. The statutory requirement that information about routine administrative
actions need be given only to "persons properly and directly concerned" has
been relied upon almost daily to withhold Government information from the
public. . . . If none of the other restrictive phrases of 5 U.S.C. 1002 [The
Administrative Procedure Act] applies to the official Government record
which an agency wishes to keep confidential, it can be hidden behind the
"good cause found" shield.
H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in [1966] 2 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS at 2423.
23. Id. at 6, reprinted in [1966] 2 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2423.
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closure. 24 Thus, the wide discretion arising under the APA in
many cases precluded the public from obtaining agency infonna
tion.
Realizing that too much information was being withheld with
out an actual basis,25 Congress again decided to attack the prob
lem. In 1965, it drafted the FOIA,26 which dealt with and modified
the two areas of the APA that had proven troublesome. This newer
statute was clearly designed to emphasize disclosure. The APA's
"good cause" standard was replaced by specific exemptions to dis
closure which were intended to reduce government abuse by limit
ing the criteria upon which information could be withheld. 27 The
"directly and properly concerned" test was also rejected in favor of
a standard that allowed disclosure to "any person,"28 thereby
alleviating court scrutiny of any person requesting infonnation. The
"any person" standard of the FOIA aids in opening agency files to
the public. 29 The FOIA has simplified the procedure by which the
public can gain access to government files. The FOIA has not,
24. "[T]here is no remedy available to a citizen who has been wrongfully
denied access to the Government's public records." ld. at 5, reprinted in [1966] 2
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2422.
25. "Withholding instances mC!unted, and stirred the concern that the AP A § 3
qualifications had made that public information law into a large loophole for agency
secrecy." See J. O'REILLY, supra note 1, at 2-4.
26. For the legislative history on the need for the FOIA, see H.R. REP., supra
note 5, reprinted in [1966] 2 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2418.
It is vital to our way of life to reach a workable balance between the right of
the public to know and the need of the Government to keep information in
confidence to the extent necessary without permitting indiscriminate se
crecy. The right of the individual to be able to find out how his Government
is operating can be just as important to him as his right to privacy and his
right to confide in his Government. This bill strikes a balance considering
all these interests.
ld. at 6, reprinted in [1966] 2 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2423.
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
28. (3) Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs
(1) and (2) of this subsection, each agency, upon any request for records
which (A) reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance
with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to
be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976).
29. In addition to attempting to solve the APA problems, other FOIA require
ments include that each agency publish its rules and methods of organization and opera
tion in the Federal Register, and give to any person access to agency policies, opin
ions, orders and administrative manuals. Materials not in the Federal Register must
be indexed so that they can be found by laypersons. These other requirements of the
FOIA strive to assure openness of agency policies and attempt to foster familiarity
with agency procedure on the part of laypersons. See id. § 552(a)(I),(2).
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however, eliminated the substantive problems in determining what
information should be available for public scrutiny.
III.

THE NEED FOR PRIVACY

The FOIA's goal of total disclosure was necessarily thwarted
by Congress' awareness that not all information should be dis
closed. The nine statutory exemptions to disclosure30 provide that
certain records specified in the Act can legitimately be withheld
from the public because of the importance of other interests which
outweigh public desire for the information.
The personal privacy exemption is based on a long-standing,
yet not clearly articulated, philosophy that people have an inher
ent right to be let alone. 31 By providing for nondisclosure of "per
sonnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
. . . ,"32 the privacy exemption emphasizes the rights of individuals
to have information about their personal lives, health, and past his
tory remain confidential. 33
30. Id. § 552(b).
31. Although no specific constitutional amendment designates the right to pri
vacy, this right is found in various areas of the law. See Glancy, The Invention of the
Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1979); Vache & Makibe, Privacy in Govern
ment Records: Philosophical Perspectives and Proposals for Legislation, 14 GONZ. L.
REV. 515 (1979). The United States Supreme Court has extended constitutional rec
ognition of the right to privacy as a penumbra of the Bill of Rights. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Passage of the
Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976), is further evidence of renewed public
awareness of government invasion into our lives. This Act regulates conditions of
disclosure of records regarding individuals. I d.
The right to be "let alone" is also a basic concept behind the creation of the in
vasion of privacy tort cause of action. See Sternal, Informational Privacy and Public
Records, 8 PAC. L.J. 25 (1977). See also Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human
Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); Project, Govern
ment Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1282-1303
(1975). For information on the NLRB and privacy, see Irving & DeDeo, The Right to
Privacy and the Freedom in Information: The NLRB and Issues Under the Privacy
Act am) the Freedom of Information Act, 29 N.Y.V. CONF. LAB. 49, 81 (1976).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
33. The legislative history names the Veteran's Administration, HEW, and the
Selective Service as agencies whose files should remain closed, but the list was not
meant to be all-inclusive. Because the history is so brief, however, it has not pro
vided an adequate background on which courts can base their determinations. The
legislative history notes as follows:
Personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy: Such
agencies as the Veterans' Administration, Department of Health, Education,
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The privacy exemption contains a technical procedure, a two
pronged test, for determining whether a file qualifies for non
disclosure. The test is derived directly from the wording of the ex
emption. 34 Under the first step, a threshold determination is made
as to whether a file is personnel, medical, or similar to those types
of files. Under the second step, a balance is struck between disclo
sure of personnel, medical, or similar types of files and the serious
ness of the invasion of privacy that disclosure would cause. There
fore, even if a file contains personnel, medical, or similar types of
information, disclosure is not to be withheld solely because of the
nature of the file. Rather, it is legally mandated that the informa
tion be kept private only if disclosure would violate the second
prong of the test by "constitut[ing] a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy."
The first two specifications in the exemption, which preclude
disclosure of personnel or medical files, are self-explanatory. 35
Such files clearly have privacy values attached. Legislative history
cites these categories as particularly deserving of protection from
public knowledge. 36
and Welfare, Selective Service, and Bureau of Prisons have great quantities
of files containing intimate details about millions of citizens. Confidentiality
of these records has been maintained by agency regulation but without stat
utory authority. A general exemption for the category of information is much
more practical than separate statutes protecting each type of personal record.
The limitation of a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" pro
vides a proper balance between the protection of an individual's right of pri
vacy and the preservation of the public's right to Government information
by excluding those kinds of files the disclosure of which might harm the in
dividual. The exemption is also intended to cover detailed Government re
cords on an individual which can be identified as applying to that individual
and not the facts concerning the award of a pension or benefit or the compi
lation of unidentified statistical information from personal records.
H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 11, reprinted in [1966] 2 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS at 2428 (footnote omitted).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
35. One problem with the definition of personnel and medical files is whether
the phrase "a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" modifies them. One
view specifies that any file that is clearly personnel or medical is exempt. Depart
ment of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352,387 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). A second
view is that neither personnel nor medical files are automatically exempt unless dis
closure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Id. at
373 (Brennan, J.).
36. At the same time that a broad philosophy of "freedom of information" is en
acted into law, it is necessary to protect certain equally important rights of privacy
with respect to certain information in Government files, such as medical and person
nel records." S. REP. No. 813, 89th CONG., 2d Sess., 3 (1966).
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The exemption for "similar files," however, is not adequately
defined in the FOIA and its interpretation has proved to be trou
blesome. Apparently, the term was used by the drafters of the
FOIA as a catch-all provision to prevent disclosure of information
which is not technically personnel or medical but analogous in na
ture, thus warranting protection from public eyes. The use of this
broad term "similar" by the drafters eliminated the need to decide
application to each of an exhaustive list of files in the possession of
the federal government. 37 Unfortunately, although the term
simplified matters for the legislature, the inherent problems in its
interpretation have confused the courts. 38 The legislative history of
the privacy exemption has not provided an adequate background
for determining which agency inf~rmation qualifies as "similar."
Consequently, holdings of cases involving "similar files" are incon
sistent.
IV.

INTERPRETATION OF "SIMILAR FILES" BY THE COURTS

The amgiguity of the nine exemptions to the FOIA has been
criticized for 'causing confusion in both agencies and the courts. 39
In the instance of the privacy exemption, the lack of clear
37. Id.
38. As well as the interpretative confusion over "similar" files, courts have split
on the weight to be given to the second prong balancing test of a "clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." An agency, or court, after having decided
that a file is similar, personnel, or medical, should then determine whether disclo
sure of such file would constitute an invasion of privacy clearly unwarranted by the
FOIA. This balancing test is used to analyze the conflicting interest. Circuits, how
ever, have varied on the interests to be weighed. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (privacy interests on the individual should be balanced against the
purpose to be served by the party requesting disclosure); cf. Ditlow v. Shultz, 517
F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (unclear whether balance should be in the context of
unrestricted disclosure to the public or use-specified release to the requestors);
Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973) (interests of the individual should be
balanced against the general public interest in disclosure).
The use of the term "clearly" in the second prong has also caused confusion.
Courts have failed to note the strong mandate toward disclosure set forth by use of
the term. The fact that some agencies strongly disapproved of its insertion into the
privacy exemption is convincing that "clearly" serves to limit the amount of informa
tion that can be statutorily exempt. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425
U.S. 352, 378 n.16 (1976). Exemption 7(C), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1976), requires a
less strict standard of disclosure, due solely to the absence of the word "clearly."
39. See Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929 (D. D.C.
1973), modified, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975);
Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (1967);
Emerson, The Danger of State Secrecy, 218 NATION 395,398 (1974); Wade, Freedom
of Information-Officials Thwart Public Right to Know, 175 SCIENCE 498 (1972).
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standards results in unpredictability of court decisions. 4o Courts
taking a broad interpretation of "similar files" emphasize the im
portance of privacy over disclosure. 41 Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v.
IRS42 exemplifies this view. There, the Third Circuit implied that
information does not have to be closely related to personnel or
medical files to be exempt under the privacy exemption. The file
in question in Wine Hobby consisted simply of names and ad
dresses of persons required to register with the United States Bu
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. 43 The court was satisfied
that the names and addresses were sufficiently personal to warrant
protection from disclosure under the privacy exemption. The Third
Circuit judges thus believed that the term "similar" was not in
tended to permit the release of files where common sense would
dictate that they be exempt. 44
In the Fourth Circuit, in contrast, the test for "similar files"
has been narrowly construed, tilting the balance toward public dis
closure to facilitate the apparent intent of the FOIA.45 In Robles v.
EPA,46 the Fourth Circuit held that "similar files" must contain

40. J. O'REILLY, supra note 1, at 1-4. The author predicts that case law will re
main inconsistent because of the different facts of each case, the varying agencies' at
titudes and the lack of weight which each circuit gives to the opinion of the other
circuits.Id.
41. Since the thrust of the exemption is to avoid unwarranted invasions of pri
vacy, the term "files" should not be given an interpretation that would often pre
clude inquiry into this more crucial question. Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502
F.2d 133, 135 (3d Cir. 1974).
42. 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
43. Under federal regulations, anyone making wine solely for family use is ex
empt from taxation. Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d at 134. Registration with
the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms is required. The plain
tiff, a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the manufacturing and sale of home
wine-making kits, sought disclosure of all registrants with the Bureau. The regis
trants numbered several thousand. The corporation, Wine Hobby USA, Inc., wanted
the names to conduct an advertising campaign. Id.
44. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
45. See Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1977); New
England Medical Center v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1976); Title Guar. Co. v.
NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976), cen. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); Metropolitan
Life Ins. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150, 166 (D.D.C. 1976); Waples, The Freedom of In
formation Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 895 (1974).
46. 484 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The EPA in 1970 studied radiation levels in
homes and buildings where such uranium had been used. Uranium tailings, a by
product of uranium processing, were commonly used as clean fill dirt in commun
ities. The agency denied the plaintiff the results, offering all but the names and ad
dresses of homeowners.

826

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:815

" 'intimate details' of a 'highly personal' nature"47 to qualify under
the privacy exemption. The court reached this conclusion by find
ing that the basis for the personnel file exemption was the inclu
sion of personal details. By analogy, the court concluded that "sim
ilar files" should contain similar information. 48 The Robles court, in
contrast to Wine Hobby, based its narrow interpretation of "similar
files" on a leading FOIA case, Getman v. NLRB. 49 Getman, like
Wine Hobby, involved the disclosure of names and addresses. The
names and addresses were of employees involved in union efforts.
The requesters were law professors working on a publication re
garding workers and unions. The opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Getman
differs from that of the Third Circuit in that it did allow the names
and addresses of the workers to be turned over to the requesters.
The Getman court found that the intent of the FOIA was best
served by allowing exemption only for files which are unquestiona
bly private in nature. 50
Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture 51 is an
example of information clearly containing the narrow "intimate de
tails" required in the Robles test. The document in question was a
housing report made in a study conducted by the Department of
Agriculture. 52 The court of appeals found this report to be a similar
file because it contained "information regarding marital status, le
47. [d. at 845; cf. Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d at 133 (standards
used for determining a similar file are less strict).
48. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 451 F. Supp. 736 (D. Md.
1978). In that case, an Employer Information Report form filed by Nationwide Insur
ance with the Social Security Administration was disclosed to the American Jewish
Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. [d. at 738. The insur
ance company sought to have the information withheld, yet the court, emphasizing
the strong intent toward disclosure, construed the exemptions narrowly. [d. at 740.
49. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Getman allowed disclosure of names and ad
dresses of certain employees to law professors who were engaged in a study of union
election procedures.
50. Both the House and Senate reports on the bill which became the
Freedom of Information Act indicate that the real thrust of Exemption (6) is
to guard against unnecessary disclosure of files of such agencies as the Vet
erans Administration or the Welfare Department or Selective Service or Bu
reau of Prisons, which would contain "intimate details" of a "highly personal"
nature. [d. at 675 (footnotes oll1itted).
51. 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
52. The study stemmed from allegations by the Rural Housing Alliance that
discrimination existed in the dissemination of loans. [d. at 75. The District of Colum
bia Circuit found that the study was a "similar" file and remanded for a determina
tion of whether disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of per
sonal privacy. [d. at 76.
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gitimacy of children, identity of fathers of children, medical condi
tion, welfare payments, alcoholic consumption, family fights, [and]
reputation. . . . "53 Anyone gaining access to this report clearly
would have personal details of the participants' style of living and
could use this information to the disadvantage of the individual
respondent, who at the time of taking part in the study would
have been unaware that such information would be made public.
Because of the many personal details of this report, the court of ap
peals reasoned that such intimacy should not be public informa
tion.
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the term
"similar" in only one privacy exemption case, Department of the
Air Force v. Rose. 54 Although the opinion has not greatly aided the
circuits in their need for a uniform approach, Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, persuasively cites legislative history to
support a narrow construction of the term. The information sought
was case summaries of students of the United States Air Force
Academy which were kept in the Honor and Ethics Code files. The
summaries were usually developed when a student was accused of
a violation of the Honor Code, a potentially damaging situation.
Brennan noted that the files are not actually personnel files but are
in fact similar files. 55 The files were termed "similar" because the
material contained in them consisted of personal details and be
cause privacy values attached to the reports made on the students'
conduct. Even with the finding that the similar files were private
in nature, however, the Supreme Court held that in light of the
broad intent toward disclosure of government information, the in
dividual student in question would not be unduly harmed by pub
lic knowledge of the material in his file. Thus, even where a file is
termed "similar," nondisclosure is not inevitable. The second
prong, the determination of whether disclosure would clearly in
vade privacy, can be decisive.
The Third Circuit in Wine Hobby and the Fourth Circuit in
Robles demonstrate a conflict, which the Fifth Circuit accentuates.
53. 498 F.2d at 77.
54. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
55. Another issue in the privacy exemption, not definitively answered, is
whether the phrase "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" modifies the
terms "personnel" and "medical" as well as the term "similar." Id. Justice Brennan
holds that all three categories are modified by the phrase. Id. at 373. But cf. id. at
387 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (the restrictive phrase applies only to "similar"; the
exemption for personnel and medical files is clear and unembellished).
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The issue in this conflict is whether common sense or leglSlal1Vv
mandate should be followed in deciding a privacy case. The Third
Circuit in Wine Hobby chose a result-oriented approach. The
Fourth Circuit in Robles, on the other hand, set a standard based
on the legislative mandate of the FOIA. Ideally, Congress incorpo
rates both common sense and public sentiment into legislation. In
privacy exemption cases, it is difficult to fulfill the goal of inter
preting the meaning of "similar files" while balancing the need to
protect certain privacy rights. Pacific Molasses is evidence of the
tension that is created by these two aims.

V.

ANALYSIS

The document in Pacific Molasses does not on its face contain
personal details similar to those in Rural Housing Alliance. 56 The
Pacific Molasses court notes at the outset of its opinion that the
proper formula for determining whether the privacy exemption
should apply to a document consists of first deciding if the cards
fall into the category of personnel, medical, or similar files. The
second inquiry is whether disclosure of cards would be an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 57 The court, in contra
vention to this formula, determined that the union authorization
cards should not be accessible to the requester. While it discusses
the two-pronged test, it fails to adhere to it in its actual determina
tion of whether the cards should be disclosed. 58 Instead of finding
the cards to be similar based on the amount and type of informa
tion they contain, the court exempts them because it contends that
their disclosure would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of the em
ployees' privacy. 59 The court, in effect, uses the second prong to
determine the applicability of the first prong of the test. The Fifth
Circuit notes in its opinion that it feels, as does the Third Circuit,
that the emphasis should be placed on whether disclosure will re
sult in a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, rather than al
lowing the classification given to the material as personnel, med
ical, or similar to prevent application of the exemption.
The court relies on case law to support its decision. One of the
factors relied on is the "personal nature" criteria set out in Rose. 6o
56. 498 F.2d at 73. See also text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
57. 577 F.2d at 1178.
58. See id. at 1180-81 n.5. The court here openly rejects the "intimate details"
test used in Robles. Id. See also, notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
59. 577 F.2d at 1182. The judges base their feelings on the chilling effect lan
guage which permeates the NLRA. See text accompanying note 69 infra.
60. 425 U.S. at 352.
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This reliance is misplaced because Rose is distinguishable from Pa
cific Molasses. The files in Rose contain detailed information about
an indivudual and his past. Presumably, summaries of cadets' al
leged wrongdoing contain information having a great potential to
inflict harm upon the individual if such knowledge becomes public.
Pacific Molasses concerns only the limited job information listed on
an authorization card. In Rose, the Supreme Court declined to
withhold the cadets' files, even though there was a clear potential
for harm. Such harm is not as clear in Pacific Molasses, yet the
court chose to exempt the cards from disclosure.
Pacific Molasses also relies on the holding of Wine Hobby
which held that the term "files" should be construed broadly to in
clude any information that a court feels would violate privacy
rights. 61 This view conflicts with the thrust of the FOIA that there
be disclosure, and it reflects the Third Circuit's bias toward privacy
rights. The Wine Hobby rationale contributes to the logic used by
the Pacific Molasses court in its expansive use of the exemption.
Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB,62 which closely re
sembles the facts and holding of Pacific Molasses, provides the
third criteria which the Fifth Circuit followed. In Masonic Homes,
the Third Circuit found that union authorization cards contain a
"thumbnail sketch"63 of an employee's job classification and status.
From -this analysis, it reasons that the files are similar. Pacific Mo
lasses cited Masonic Homes with little of its own analysis as to why
such information should be considered "similar."
Disclosure of an employee's job classification and status is not
necessarily a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. Although an
individual employee's request to schedule a union election is a per
sonal decision with which the Fifth Circuit sympathized and
wanted to protect,64 the privacy exemption should not be applied
for such arbitrary reasons. The "thumbnail sketch" of one's current
employment is not persuasive for application of the standards ~f
the privacy exemption, because the card, with the "sketch" it con

61. 502 F.2d at 133.
62. 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977); accord, United Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB,
449 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Tex. 1978). Contra, Howard Johnson Co. v. NLRB, 444 F.
Supp. 843 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (union authorization cards not exempt under the pri
vacy exemption). See Sobol, supra note 10.
63. 556 F.2d at 220.
64. See Davis, supra note 39, at 762. "[O]ne recurring problem is what to do
when no exemption specifically authorizes non-disclosure but when common sense
obviously requires it." Id.
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tains, 'is not similar to a personnel file. 65 An authorization card con
taining an employee's name, address, employer, and job classifica
tion has little of the data that a similar file should contain. As
Judge Skelton notes, a file similar to a personnel file should contain
"vast amounts of personal data . . . showing, for example, where
. '.. [the individual] was bom,the names of his parents, where he
had lived from time to time, his high school or other school record,
results of examinations, . [and] evaluations of his work perform
ance. 66 The authorization card certainly is not of the detailed na
ture of the study found, for example, in either Rural Housing or
Rose. 67
In the split between FOIA and the National Labor Rela
tions Act (NLRA)68 policy, the Fifth Circuit clearly falls on the side
of labor rather than the FOIA. First, the judges invoke the "chilling
effect"69 doctrine as evidence of the need for protection of the
cards. They speculate that disclosure would effectively foreclose
use of the cards because employees would be afraid to sign them.
Consequently, the employees' right to organize as set forth in sec
tion 7 of the NLRA would be impeded. 70 The court analogizes dis
closure of the cards to the posting of a sign in the workplace say
ing: "Sign up for the union here."71 Just as few workers would join
under the watchful eyes of the employer, the court believes most
workers would decline to sign a card that they thought would be
viewed by the employer. Second, the court notes that the general
secrecy of union proceedings, and specifically of union elections, is
a characteristic of labor organizing that should be maintained.
While the actual ballots used in an election are confidential by stat
ute,72 the judges maintained that the secrecy of ballots should be
extended to authorization cards. This perspective is drawn more
from a desire to foster the right to unionize rather than from a
knowledge of the intent of the FOIA.
The judges fail to note that, although the secrecy of ballots is
65. See note 13 supra for a discussion of the treatment of authorization cards un
der other exemptions to the FOIA.
66, 577 F.2d at 1185 (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. at
377).
67. See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
69. See 577 F.2d at 1181.
70. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
71. 577 F.2d at 1181 (quoting Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556
F.2d at 221).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(I) (1976).
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authorized by statute,73 the confidentiality of union authorization
cards is not specified by the NLRA. Without the statutory authori
zation of privacy for the cards, the act of the judges in protecting
the cards constitutes judicial legislation. An amendment to the
NLRA by Congress specifically mandating secrecy of authorization
cards would solve the problem. The cards then could be exempt
under exemption three of the FOIA, which exempts from public
access matters "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute
. . . provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discre
tion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for with
holding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld
. . . . "74 Under exemption three of the FOIA, a statute calling for
withholding of information takes precedence over the policy of the
FOIA.75 Thus, if authorization cards were protected by statute, the
issue faced by the Fifth Circuit would be moot.
In Pacific Molasses, the judicial interpretation of "similar files"
has protected the authorization cards without resort to congres
sional action. Yet, the purpose of the two-pronged test is to allow
for the disclosure of as much material as possible. This purpose is
defeated by the treatment Pacific Molasses gives the exemption in
its manipulation of the clearly unwarranted invasion standard in a
manner that precludes a strict determination of the classification of
a file.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Pacific Molasses, the Fifth Circuit interprets the privacy ex
emption of the FOIA. The privacy exemption 76 is designed to al
low nondisclosure only of information private in nature, that is, in
formation which is a "personnel [or] . . . medical [or] . . . similar
[file] . . . the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. "77 The court terms union
authorization cards as "similar files" and holds that they are not
subject to disclosure. In its determination that the cards are ex
empt, the court twists the test that the privacy exemption estab
73. Id.
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
75. See Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information
Act-1978, 1979 DUKE L.J. 327, 332-45 (discussing the use of the withholding stat
ute exemption).
76. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
77. Id. § 552(b)(6).
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lishes. By its holding, the court verges on allowing any invasion of
privacy to trigger application of the exemption. 78 This weakens the
goal of the FOIA, which was to allow full disclosure to the public.
Also, it permits a possible return to pre-FOIA days when agencies
were able to avoid giving information to the public.
The pull between common sense and a literal application of
the privacy exemption creates a ten~ion for judges and agencies
which ultimately forces the courts to twist the wording of the ex
emption in an attempt .to reach a practical solution. Congressional
review is clearly preferable to the continued confusion over, and
redefinition of, the privacy exemption, which causes courts to cre
ate their own standards. 79 The courts, the administrative agencies,
and the citizens for whom the FOIA was drafted will benefit from
reevaluation of the balance between privacy and the public's access
to government documents.
Barbara A . Joseph

78. "Under this holding any invasion of personal privacy would result in non
disclosure regardless of whether the material was a personnel, medical or similar
file." 577 F.2d at U88. See Note, Disclosure of Union Authorization Cards Under the

Freedom of Information Act-Interpreting the Personal Privacy Exemptions, 62
MINN. L. REV. 949 (1978) (stating that the broad interpretation set forth in Wine
Hobby and followed by Rose and Masonic Homes impliedly does away with the clas
sification of personnel, medical, or similar files).
79. Various possibilities for revamping the privacy exemption have been sug
gested and subsequently criticized. See Koch, The Freedom of Information Act; Sug
gestions for Making Information Available to the Public, 32 MD. L. REV. 189, 220
(1972) (no interference by the judiciary); Project, supra note 31, at 1085 (amendment
of the balancing test to strike out the "clearly unwarranted invasion" test, protecting
even minor invasions of privacy); Note, Freedom of Information and the Individu
al's Right to Privacy; Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 14 CAL. W. L. REV. 183,
203 (alleviation of the balancing test); Note, supra note 78 (congressional guidelines
needed to limit the broad interpretation given by cases such as Pacific Molasses, and
the amendment of the NLRA to specifically prohibit disclosure of the authorization
cards).

